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BAR BRIEFS
CORPORATION TRUST COMPANY EXPLAINS
In a very comprehensive pamphlet recently issued by the
Corporation Trust Company, an answer is made to the question of
"Why must I have a lawyer"?
The pamphlet explains why it is to the best interest of business organizations that they have an attorney, stating among
other things that "safe and efficient statutory representation
therefore, is that which provides a business organization for the
business details, working hand in hand with the company's own
lawyer for their proper application" and that no one but a lawyer
is fit to make such applications.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS BRIEFS
LAWYER DISBARRED FOR AIDING UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE
Another case condemning the lawyer who aids unlawful
practice of the law, is the recent case of "In the matter of Paul
E. Tuthill, an attorney", before the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First department, April, 1939, New York.
Tuthill was found to have aided in unlawful practices of a
corporation known as Transatlantic Estates & Credit Company,
Inc., upon an investigation being made of the activities of the corporation, in New York. In 1930, the corporation was dissolved
in New York, and reorganized in New Jersey, the respondent aiding in all of its work when the corporation continued its unlawful
activities in New York State, Tuthill continuing to reside in New
York City.
The Court found that the sole business of the corporation
was searching out and procuring claims, furnishing counsel and
legal advice and that such activities constituted the unlawful
practice of the law. The Respondent was disbarred.
BANK ORDERED TO CEASE TAX SERVICE
A consent decree was recently entered in the Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, courts wherein the Union Trust Company of Pittsburgh was ordered to cease and discontinue the practice of procuring an attorney and furnishing the services of an attorney at
its banking house.
CLAIM OF REAL ESTATE CORPORATION DENIED
On January 9, 1939, in the case of Collacott Realty Inc.,
versus John Homuth, Municipal Court of Cleveland, Judge Lillian
Westropp denied the claim of the realty company for services
alleged to have been performed, on the grounds that a portion of
the services furnished by the realty company were the practices
of the law, and constituted the unauthorized practice of the law
lVy a corporation.

BAR BRIEFS
SERVICE BUREAU ENJOINED
On February 23, 1939, the Philadelphia Court of Common
Pleas No. 6, in the case of W. Richardson Blair, Jr., et al, versus
Motor Carriers Service Bureau, Inc., et al, issued a restraining
order enjoining the Motor Carriers Service Bureau, Inc., Tax Service Company and James H. McGurk, doing business as the Motor
Carriers Association, from engaging in the practice of the law.
LAYMAN FOUND GUILTY OF CONTEMPT
On January 18, 1939, one Frank Sevedin, was found guilty of
contempt of court by the Circuit Court of Wayne County, Michigan, in case No. 64, 503, wherein the Respondent was found to
have been acting as a "runner" for an attorney; occupying space
in the attorney's office, paying no rental therefor, except that of
procuring law business for the attorney.
From American Bar Association Committee on Unauthorized
Practice.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
State of North Dakota, Pitf, and Resp., vs. Bertel Jacobson, Deft. and
Applt.
That the person verifying by oath an accusation in writing presented to
the district court, seeking to have an officer removed from office on the
grounds of charging and collecting illegal fees for services rendered in his
office, is not such "a party to the record of any civil action or proceeding, or
a person for whose immediate benefit such action or proceeding is prosecuted
or defended, * * described in section 7870 of the Compiled Laws, permitting
such party to the record to "be examined upon the trial thereof as if under
cross-examination
."
That Section 10482 of the Compiled Laws, providing for the trial of an
officer charged with "collecting illegal fees for services rendered or to be rendered in his office, * 0 " upon "an accusation in writing and verified by oath
of any person * * " does not require the jury determining the case to specify
in the verdict what one or more of a series of charges has been supported by
the evidence, but permits the verdict of the jury to be either "guilty" or "not
guilty".
That where removal from office is attempted by judicial proceedings
under the provisions of article 2 of chapter 4 of the Code of Criminal procedure, an accusation in writing may be presented by the grand jury or may
be made "in writing and verified by the oath of any -person * 0 " and when
the latter form of accusation is presented to the district court the offenses
to be charged therein are limited to the allegation that the officer has
charged and collected illegal fees for services rendered or to be rendered in
his office or that the officer "has refused or neglected to perform the official
duties pertaining to his office, or has -rendered himself incompetent to perform his duties .by reason of habitual drunkenness or other cause * * ".
That under the provisions of section 5 of the initiated measure approved
June 29, 1932, the only recompense a county commissioner may recover for his
services from a county having a population exceeding nine thousand is a per
diem allowance of five dollars "and the actual amount necessarily expended
by them (him) for expense of travel in the performance of official duty * 0 ",
but such expense of travel recoverable may not exceed "the sum of Seven
Cents (7c) per mile actually and necessarily traveled by motor vehicle or
team, when such motor vehicle or team is not owned by the county or other
political subdivision, and not exceeding the sum of Five Cents (5c) for each
mile actually and necessarily traveled
" when such travel is by rail or
other common carrier.

